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A Systems Approach
to lntersubjectivity
Rino Genovese

If all knowledgewereknowledge of the universe
as a whole, therewould be no knowledge.Bertrand Russell

The question of intersubjectivity has a long history behind it;
however, it is still an unsolved problem. It is by now widely
accepted that the nature of any real philosophical question is such
that it can be dissolved, not solved. It may be added that a problem ought at least to be exactly located if it is to be dissolved; but
this is not even the case with intersubjectivity. A heap of different
objects are covered by this heading, ranging between the criterion
of intersubjective validity (in neopositivistic theory of knowledge,
this takes the place of the old concept of truth as reciprocal adequacy between subject and object) and the concept of mutual
understanding in a hermeneutic theory of communication with its
ethical consequences. As is well known, the concept of intersubjectivity reached sociology via Alfred Schutz (1962), especially
through his reworking of Husserl's (1954) notion of Lebenswelt,
this being under many respects analogous to Wittgenstein's (1953)
Lebensform.
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The contact point between these theories seems to me to be a
negative, rather than a positive one: that is to say, none of them
dares to question openly what all of them presuppose: the concept of subject. This failure is probably pushed to the extreme in
Habermas's Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (1981), an
attempt to combine all current theoretical approaches to the problem of intersubjectivity. Here subjects seem to arise almost spontaneously out of the interactive field, coming into existence
through verbal language. The intersubjectivity of shared symbols
and values inheres from the beginning in language, whose immanent telos is that an agreement should be produced between subjects who may be defined only through intersubjectivity itself.
Such a circle, however, only conceals the theoretical vacuum
where the notion of subject lies abandoned.
This notion was last thoroughly scrutinized by Husserl. It is
well known that the phenomenological analysis aims at grasping
the nature of consciousness in its most minute details: to this
effect, intersubjectivity is introduced in the first place through the
notion of "monadological intersubjectivity" (Husserl, 1950), i.e.,
beginning with the closed dimension of consciousness within
which the alter ego is posited by analogy. Later on, in order also to
mitigate the virtually solipsistic character inherent in the monadological approach, Husserl will lay stress on the world that is common to all, the Lebenswelt. In any case, the subject, or
consciousness, is never questioned in the phenomenological theory despite extremely interesting analyses. In my opinion, however, a theory of intersubjectivity cannot avoid facing the problem of
defining the subject: it must first of all be a theory of subjectivity.
In order to define what is a subject, one has to describe the
process by which it is constituted. In what sense may someone,
or something, talk about itself as being a subject provided with
memory, self-consciousness and all the other features which philosophy has traditionally assigned to the subject? When beginning to answer this question, a systems approach can make use of
the distinction drawn between the observer and the system. If the
problems of subjectivity, and the related one of intersubjectivity,
have to do with the question of the observer, it follows that they
are on the level of the theory of knowledge, i.e., not, for instance,
on the level of ethics. The constitution of the subject pertains to
the manner after which the system is observed. This relation is, of
2.
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course, itself ambiguous, in that the observer, as observed by
another system, is himself a system. Saying that the constitution
of the subject pertains to the relation between observer and system implies that we should deal with observing a system that
observes other systems. It can be seen that we are moving within
the scope of a "second order" cybernetics (von Foerster, 1984).
On which conditions, then, is it possible to call subject an
observed and observing system? By laying stress on the conditions, we turn the classical transcendental problem of the "conditions of the possibility of experience" into the problem of the
conditions of the possibility of the subject. The subject is seen
there as the result of a process, or rather of a constrained set of
processes. In other words, we need only assume the existence of
cognitive processes (perceptions, beliefs, and so on) as processes
that may in turn be observed and described. However, we will
not go so far as to attribute these cognitive processes directly to a
transcendentally structured subject, nor to an individual empirical mind; rather, we shall consider them as being part of
Bateson's (1972) mind: short arcs of a wider circuits network.
Thus we try to avoid the traditional fallacy met when talking
about the subject, i.e., that of considering it as a wholly self-transparent observer, one that cannot be observed, but can only selfobserve itself. On the contrary, we aim at observing, from a
relatively external point of view, how short arcs of a circuit, i.e.,
partial cognitive processes, generate something like a self-conscious subject.
The question is then: On which conditions may an observing
system, that is, a certain set of cognitive processes, be called a sub ject? In order to get ready to answer this question, we must introduce the concept of point of view. Like all cybernetical processes,
cognitive processes are selective ones. Any selection process may
be observed and described as triggered from any determined
point. That is to say: the above-mentioned short arcs of a circuit
may be cut after different ways. We shall call point of view the
point where a selection process is triggered off: to an observer's
eye, this is the point whence a given cognitive process starts.
Thus the concept of point of view, as a tool in observing cognitive
processes, refers to the way in which they are to be handled.
Because only a cognitive process is able to observe and describe
another cognitive process, the notion of point of view refers to the
concept of self-observation of cognitive processes as a whole. If
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the short arcs are never a whole circuit, self-observing of the cognitive processes may only succeed by putting the partial segments
together and letting them play with each other. However, each
cognitive process - that is, each arc of the whole circuit-may be
observed by cutting yet another arc, i.e., through the shifting of
points of view. Any point of view refers to another point of view
from which it can be observed. Thus the network of knowledge is
progressively construed in a self-referential way.
We may now apply the constructivist theory of knowledge
(Morin, 1986; von Glasersfeld, 1987; Genovese, 1989) thus
sketched to the subject itself. How can an observer attribute the
features of the subject either to himself or to another? The subject
is constituted by cognitive processes: that is to say, the subject
should be understood as the possibility for given processes to
return, as selectiveinsistenceof certain points of view as opposed
to others. In other words, the subject is a set of points of view
repeating itself. This definition is part of a theory of observation
which differentiates, on the one hand, points of view returning as
triggers of actual cognitive processes and, on the other hand,
merely hypothetical points of view: these are considered, and
then set aside, or else simply neutralized as triggers of possible
observations. A set of points of view is a subject if it repeats itself;
relatively stabilized cognitive processes are produced in relation
to a point of view within its circle, and/ or in respect of an external observer who may, of course, be a merely hypothetical one.
3.
From what has been said till now, it may be derived that the
shifting of points of view is the crucial moment in the constitution
of the subject: because of it, certain cognitive processes may be
taken to be relatively stabilized, as distinguished from other processes . Failing this play or shifting of perspective , nothing like a
subject would appear; indeed, there would be no knowledge at
all, as no term of comparison would be available. A set of points
of view may only repeat itself, and stabilize certain cognitive processes, if it is compared to others which do not repeat themselves.
This in turn happens under an observer's eye: a subject may be
defined as such within a shifting of points of view, outside or
inside of its circle, which makes it identifiable by an observer, or
even by itself in the process of self-observing.
A subject is a subject on condition that a relatively stabilized
set of points of view be cut out of the total network of cognitive
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processes in the world. Cognitive comparisons are brought about
through a shifting of points of view: on the ground of these comparisons, it becomes possible to decide what is a subject and what
is not. Thus, any observer may attribute to itself, or another, the
features of the subject. The notion of subject is twice observerdependent: first, because the subject is such for an observer; second, because a subject is nothing else but an observing system
whose ability to repeat its cognitive operations is recognized.
The distinction between different kinds of cognitive processes is implied by the definition of the relation between the notions
of observer and subject, as given above. Some cognitive processes
are actually available, e.g., in computers and automata; on the
contrary, others may only come up again through the play of virtual points of view. An individual and self-conscious mind constitutes itself whenever a set of points of view is able to find its
selections again and again, not just by identifying itself with the
other, and taking the other's role-this is the opinion of George H.
Mead-but also by attributing a role to the other, i.e., through the
construction of a term of comparison for its own repeatable identity. In my opinion, this constructivist moment, when the other is
produced, is the salient feature of a systems approach to the problems of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. If the other were not
there, one should make it up: only by comparing itself with points
of view that are not its own, a set of points of view is established
as a repeatable identity. This is proved by the function of memory, where actual points of view refer to merely virtual ones, those
from the past, as if these were others; those that return are able to
do so because others are excluded, as they are forgotten or
repressed through a selective relation. The function of the other is
then more general than the function of memory. Husserl thought
memory provided the pattern from which the alter ego could be
inferred: the other in an intersubjective relation was introduced
on the analogy of the past ego, which is equally alien to the actual
ego. Husserl aimed at finding the other immanent within the
consciousness: here, however, it is the other who ensures the very
possibility for memory, and therefore for consciousness, to exist.
This is a consequence of the loss of the immediate notion of consciousness; it also follows from the attempt at providing a
description of its constitutive process. The function of the other
enables the points of view to shift and compare themselves to
others. This function is more general than that of memory
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because it implies an ability to draw comparisons which operates
in memory, too. Selectivity ensures that nothing may be taken as
a term of comparison
if not by excluding something else.
Selectively again, memory stabilizes a subject by causing something to return, while leaving something else out.
Within this theoretical frame a cognitive process-for
instance, a belief-may be attributed to a subject only if it returns
in relation to other beliefs which also return, but only as excluded
ones. We may then draw a distinction between believed beliefs
and unbelieved beliefs. A subject stabilizes itself in relation to
something generally other. Also, the function of the other makes
it possible to establish relations to this "other": it makes no difference whether these are relations of agreement or disagreement,
aversion or indifference.
What does matter is that terms of comparison should be
available, so that there may be other possibilities against which
one can measure itself. Other beliefs may even be only imagined
ones, just fictions.
There are remarkable consequences to intersubjectivity which
derive from the notion of subjectivity sketched above. First of all,
this notion is part of the theory of knowledge: it would be very
difficult to build social and ethical theories upon it, as these need
to assume the existence of shared symbols and values. On the
contrary, the shifting of points of view and the comparison are
possible precisely because not all symbols and values are shared.
Sharing is a very special case of intersubjectivity, whereby circles
of points of view establish habitual comparisons with other circles, on the ground of an actual or presumed agreement, so that
particular cognitive operations of anticipation and forecasting
may be obtained. The scientific community offers a well-known
example. Through fixed, repeatable procedures an intersubjective
standard is reached which on principle causes possible divergences to be reduced, thus making future results foreseeable.
However, not all existing beliefs are scientific ones, and it is
by now well known that no cultural form can understand all cultural forms. The tendency to closure in the different communicative milieus, each cultural form presenting itself as exclusive of
the others, when not as the best one, sees to it that there are different ways to share values and symbols, all of them equally legitimate. Such being the state of things, concepts like point of view,
4.
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shifting and comparisonare not to be taken as regulating ideals and
exhortations to openness, which would risk being utterly useless,
but rather as the description of moments that are as it were necessary in order that even a closure may be effected. If a belief or a
cultural form does not see the others, this does not mean that it
will not have a relation to them, be it a merely negative or neutrally indifferent one; what it does mean is that the circle of its selfobservation, the circle of points of view available to it, generates a
limited number of comparisons. No matter how hard one tries to
increase the possibilities to shift one's points of view, to enlarge,
so to say, one's horizons, these will always be limited to a certain
degree. It is part of the principle of selection itself that something
should be left out entirely, so that comparisons may be established with something else. Should there be total knowledge,
there would be no knowledge, as in that case there would be no
perspective, no distinction between fore- and background, and all
would shade off.
Talking about intersubjectivity leads to a kind of perspectivism, all the more radical in that it is aware of its being unavoidable. But if it is true that one cannot escape the relativity of
perspectives, we can nevertheless describe the movement through
which this relativity gets organized. In this sense relativism does
by no means imply a conviction to theoretical powerlessness. The
different perspectives pertain to meaningful contexts within
which the shifting of points of view and the cognitive compar isons are possible by means of their very self-referential closure.
Any observer is a subject in relation to others, if only in a negative
way, when it establishes habitual comparisons which fix some
cognitive processes: beliefs, for instance. The intervention of theory in the field of belief appears therefore to open other possibilities and soberly recalls the necessary limitations inherent in any
perspective.
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